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Abstract 
We reexamine the effect of financial restatements on the cost of equity vis-a-vis litigation 
risk. Specifically, we study the effect of litigation on post-restatement financing costs and 
whether market anticipates litigation before restatement announcement as evident from its 
effect on financing costs. In a sample of 91 restatements, while we find that the cost of equity 
increases subsequent to a financial restatement for all restating firms, the increase is 
substantially greater for firms facing litigation as a result of the restatement. We also find that 
investors do not adjust for the cost of equity prior to the announcement of a financial 
restatement for firms facing post-restatement litigation. Overall, our findings suggest that most 
of the increase in the cost of equity after restatement is concentrated in sued sub-sample and 
that the cost of equity is an important channel through, which litigation associated with 
financial restatement is priced. The economic effect of post-restatement litigation is 
approximately 259 basis points increase in the firm’s cost of equity. 
 
Keywords: Cost of Equity, Litigation, Financial Restatements, Earnings Forecasts, Analyst 
Forecasts 
JEL Classification: G14, G12, K22, M41 
 2  
1. Introduction 
Due largely to their negative valuation effect, financial restatements attracted significant 
attention from policy-makers and helped motivate various regulations, including some 
provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). A sizeable stream of 
literature has sought to understand the economic effects of financial restatements by publicly 
traded corporations (Palmrose et al., 2004; Bardos and Zaiats, 2012).  Negative valuation effect 
of restatement announcement may be attributed to: i) the adjustment down of expected future 
cash flows and/or ii) the upward adjustment of the cost of capital. In a sample of restatements, 
Hribar and Jenkins (2004) find evidence supporting a significant valuation effect through both 
of these channels. In particular, first, they find that analysts revise forecasts downward 
subsequent to restatements. Second, they find that the cost of equity increases following 
restatements, and that the increase in the cost of equity is larger for auditor initiated 
restatements and highly levered firms.  Consistent with the findings of Hribar and Jenkins, 
Graham et al., (2008) find that restatements increase the cost of debt and have adverse impact 
on loan contracting. More specifically, they find that loans initiated after restatement have 
significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more 
covenant restrictions than loans initiated before restatement. Gleason et al., 2005 and Wilson 
(2008) find that investors temporarily loose confidence in the credibility of subsequent financial 
reports of restating firms. 
Prior literature cites several potential reasons why restatements may trigger decreases in 
expected future earnings and increases in the cost of capital resulting in the loss of firm value. 
First, restatements may reveal that previously reported earnings were overstated, which would 
result in downward revision of expected future earnings. Empirical evidence supports this 
reasoning (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Palmrose et al., 2004). Second, loss of management 
credibility may indicate suboptimal investment and operation policies, and thus may lead to an 
increase in the costs of internal monitoring, costly management changes, and increased 
regulatory scrutiny. Accordingly, Burks (2010), Desai et al. (2006) and Agrawal and Cooper 
(2007) find high turnover among top management (e.g., CEOs and CFOs) and poor job 
prospects subsequent to restatements.  Moreover, top management of firms named in SEC 
enforcement actions -- many of which result in a restatement -- face harsh legal and regulatory 
sanctions and suffer substantial losses (Karpoff, et al. 2007a, 2007b). Third, restatements can 
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increase uncertainty about the overall quality of financial statements and thus increase 
information risk of the firm. Consistent with this prediction, Kravet and Shevlin (2010) find an 
increase in the pricing of earnings quality subsequent to restatements. Bardos (2011) finds that 
liquidity decreases for several years after restatement. 
The class action lawsuit following a restatement is potentially another important factor 
that triggers a decrease in expected future earnings and an increase in the cost of capital. 
Literature points that restatements are likely to attract litigation.  Jones and Weingram (1997) 
analyze five factors that influence the likelihood of being subject to class action (Rule 10b-5) 
(restatements, insider trading, seasoned equity offerings, SEC enforcement actions, and negative 
press releases)1 and find that restatement increases litigation risk more than all other events. 
Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2010) also find that restatement increases the likelihood of litigation 
for a larger sample of class action lawsuits. Litigation is a costly event for the firm and imposes 
large direct and indirect costs to defendant firms (Gande and Lewis, 2007).  Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) find that 37% of restating firms are sued as a result of a restatement. They also 
show that sued restating firms experience significantly higher negative market reaction (-22%) 
to the restatement announcement compared to non-sued restating firms (-4%). Similarly, Bardos 
et al., (2013) find that litigation risk is an important determinant of market reaction to 
restatements, which accounts for as much as 50% of stock price drop. However, the literature is 
silent on the effect of litigation on post-restatement financing costs. Apart from this, no prior 
work has examined whether anticipation of litigation affects the cost of capital before 
restatement announcement. In this paper, we fill this void in the literature by studying the link 
between litigation–triggering financial restatements and the firm’s cost of equity.  
 We address this question by empirically examining the effect of litigation triggering 
restatements on the cost of equity and expected future cash flows compared to restatements that 
are not followed by litigation. It is plausible that the increase in the cost of equity after 
restatements documented by Hribar and Jenkins (2004) is entirely driven by litigation triggering 
restatements and cannot be generalized to the entire sample of all restating firms, therefore 
 
1 Securities class action lawsuits filed under Rule 10b-5 allege material flaws pertaining to firms’ 
disclosure. Allegedly, firms’ misstatements cause inflation in the stock price during the class action 
period. Most of these lawsuits are filed on behalf of shareholders who bought the stock during the period 
of inflated stock prices and are entitled to compensation. 
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weakening their conclusion that “perceptions about earnings quality affects a firm’s cost of 
capital” (page 339). It does not rule out the possibility  that the decrease in earnings quality in 
the absence of potential litigation (e.g. due to fraud) does not affect systematic risk.   
We estimate the cost of equity for three months prior to a restatement and three months 
after a restatement using four models of implied cost of equity: Easton (2004), Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005), Gebhardt et al., (2001), and Claus and Thomas (2001).2   Implied cost of 
capital methodology allows us to separate cash flow and cost of capital effects. We use analyst 
forecasts revised after the announcement of both restatement and litigation to control for the 
cash flow effect when estimating after-event cost of equity.  Griffin (2003) shows that financial 
analysts revise forecasts in the month of corrective disclosure, such as a restatement, and Barniv 
and Cao (2008) find that the market relies more on analyst forecasts after restatement 
announcement. There should be no change in the cost of equity if litigation costs are fully priced 
through the cash flow effect.  In that case, much larger stock price decline associated with 
litigation triggering restatements can be fully attributed to the cash flow effect.  At the same 
time, Kim and Shi (2011) find that disclosure of negative earnings forecasts by management 
results in higher cost of capital in the month after the disclosure, suggesting that negative 
financial information reflected in restatements also affects systematic risk. 
We find that the cost of equity increases after restatement for all firms. However, the 
increase in the cost of equity is substantially greater for firms that are sued as a result of a 
restatement. In univariate tests, while we find that sued restating firms have greater decline in 
expected cash flows than non-sued restating firms, the cost of equity increases by 350 basis 
points after restatement for the sued sub-sample (35 firms) and by only 40 basis points for the 
non-sued sub-sample (56 firms). Our results suggest that a tort reform might influence market 
reaction to litigation triggering events, such as restatements, consistent with Li (2009), who 
shows that relaxing the legal liability can result in more information flow to the public.  
A potential concern with the interpretation of our results is that restatements that 
prompt a larger share price decline influence both the equity cost of capital and the likelihood of 
 
2 We use three month window because this gives us the largest sample size among the windows used in 
prior studies, such as Hribar and Jenkins (2004). However, we do later perform robustness tests for other 
windows. 
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litigation. To address this endogeneity concern, we perform an analysis of the cost of capital for 
a sub-sample of sued and non-sued restating firms matched on restatement announcement 
return. We are able to create 24 matched pair of sued and non-sued firms (total 48 firms), all 
result holds for this sub-sample.  
In cross-sectional tests, we continue to find a significant and positive cost of equity effect 
of post-restatement litigation after controlling for other determinants of the cost of equity. 
Economically, the incremental effect of post-restatement litigation is an increase of 
approximately 259 basis points in the firm’s cost of equity. Accordingly, we also find that 
investors do not adjust the risk premium for firms that are sued as a result of a restatement 
prior to restatement announcement. Overall, our findings suggest that the cost of equity is an 
important channel through which restatement-associated litigation is priced. Our results 
support theoretical work of Easley and O’Hara (2004) and Lambert et al. (2007) who show that 
information risk is non-diversifiable.  
We contribute to the literature in corporate reporting, cost of capital, and corporate 
finance in several ways.  First, this is the first study that examines the effect of litigation-
triggering restatements on the cost of equity. The existing literature largely assumes that 
restatements affect firm value through expected cash flows (e.g., Palmrose et al., 2004; GAO, 
2002). Hribar and Jenkins (2004) implicitly assume that all restatements increase the cost of 
equity, regardless of whether or not a firm is sued as a result of a restatement. Our results show 
that most of the increase in the cost of equity is concentrated in litigation-triggering sub-sample.  
Second, the importance of the cost of capital as the key element used in evaluating a firm’s 
strategic long-term investments makes learning the role of litigation-triggering restatements in 
the firm’s financing costs important.  
Third, our use of the cost of equity as the main test vehicle offers several other 
advantages. First, we closely relate and complement Hribar and Jenkins by examining cost of 
equity implications of litigation-triggering restatements,   however, unlike Hribar and Jenkins 
we rely on the cost of equity estimates from four different models consistent with more recent 
literature (e.g., Hail and Leuz, 2006; Dhaliwal et al, 2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 2009). Our use 
of average of several discounted valuation models is superior and consistent with more recent 
literature (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Dhaliwal et al., 2006; El Ghoul et al., 2011) because the use of a 
single model is likely to lead to spurious results. For example, Dhaliwal et al. (p. 699) state that 
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“there is considerable variation in the magnitude of the associations between the various implied cost of 
equity estimates and individual risk proxies, and there does not appear to be a consensus as to the 
superiority of any particular model in estimating the cost of equity.” Second, the finance literature 
often uses valuation measures, such as Tobin’s Q or abnormal returns, to examine the effect of 
corporate events. Tobin’s Q is also a proxy for firm growth and investment opportunity (e.g., 
see Géczy et al., 1997; Pham et al., 2007). Firms with higher potential growth and greater 
investment opportunities are expected to have higher market to book ratios. Therefore, a change 
in valuation measures, such as Tobin’s Q, may simply reflect an expected change in the firm’s 
growth rate instead of litigation risk. Our use of cost of equity rather than a valuation measure 
largely mitigates this issue.  
Fourth, we also contribute to the literature that studies the effect of securities litigation.  
Litigation is a very costly event for shareholders (Gande and Lewis, 2007). Because restatements 
increase the likelihood of costly litigation, restating firms facing litigation after a restatement are 
likely to experience a larger loss in firm value at the announcement of a restatement. Consistent 
with this idea, Bardos et al., (2013) find that a one percent increase in litigation risk decreases 
cumulative abnormal stock return by 1.5% at the announcement of a restatement. A likely 
connection of litigation to corporate valuation is that the market may downward adjust 
expected cash flows after restatement, thus negatively affecting firm value. Another plausible 
effect of litigation on valuation which is often ignored in the literature is an upward adjustment 
in the cost of equity. We contribute to the literature by showing that the cost of capital is an 
important channel through which litigation associated with financial restatement affects firm 
value. Our models allow us to estimate the cost of equity by simultaneously controlling for the 
effect of litigation (if any) on the firm’s expected cash flows.  
Apart from the contributions to the literature discussed above, our findings are relevant 
for several groups of practitioners. In particular, stock analysts providing price 
recommendations may benefit from incorporating our results in their valuation models. 
Literature suggests that the quality of stock recommendations largely depends on the accuracy 
of the forecasts of expected earnings and earnings growth. For example, several studies, 
including Bradshaw (2004), Ertimur et al. (2007), Francis and Soffer (1997), and Loh and Mian 
(2006), find that more accurate forecasts are associated with more profitable recommendations. 
Accordingly, Bandyopadhyay et al. (1995) find analysts’ price target forecasts largely depend on 
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forecasted earnings.  However, empirical evidence suggests that analysts are slow to react to 
financial restatements (Griffin, 2003). Importantly, for analysts providing price 
recommendations for restating firms, the lag in reactions may be caused primarily by their 
failure to properly adjust the cost of equity in the face of post-restatement litigation. Prior 
research has shown that firms that face high litigation risk are identifiable (Jones and 
Weingram, 1997; Francis et al., 1994; Gande and Lewis, 2007). Therefore, analysts and investors 
may estimate the likelihood of litigation using the models developed in these studies as a 
potential guide and adjust the cost of equity upwards for firms that face high litigation risk after 
restatement announcement.  
Our findings may also interest investors and policy-makers who are trying to assess the 
full impact of restatements. For example, as stated earlier in this section, financial restatements 
have received significant attention from policy-makers and helped motivate various regulations 
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). Our findings may further bolster this interest from policy-makers 
in pin-pointing future regulations related to financial information reporting and restatements as 
well as tort reform. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and the research design. 
Section 3 describes the results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Data and Research Design 
Our sample consists of U.S. firms from three different sources. First, we start with 537 
financial restatement announcements made by 496 U.S. Corporations from January 1, 1997 
through June 30, 2002.  We manually collected restatement dates and restatement characteristics 
from Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases. We searched Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases using 
key words “restatement,” “restat,” “revis,” “adjust,” “error,” and “responding to guidance from 
the SEC” from January 1, 1997 through June 30, 2002. There are two advantages to using this 
period for our analysis. First, the GAO made a sample of restatements announced in this period 
publicly available, which allowed us to cross-check announcement dates and other restatement 
characteristics. Second, all restatements precede the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is, according to 
Li et al. (2008, pp. 111), “the most important legislation affecting corporate financial reporting enacted 
in the United States since the 1930s.” Therefore, our results are free from the potential effect of this 
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major regulatory change on the firm’s cost of capital.  Moreover, restatements after SOX became 
more technical in nature (Burks, 2010).3 
We then merged this sample of restatements with the firms represented in Compustat 
North America and Thompson Institutional Brokers Earnings Services (I/B/E/S) for the event 
years, which left us with 345 restatements made by 326 firms. We selected the firms for which 
I/B/E/S contained information within +3/-3 months surrounding the event month, where 
event month is defined as the month containing the restatement announcement. Following the 
existing literature (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2006), we required that the I/B/E/S earnings history file 
contained: i) a positive mean earnings forecast for the first two years, ii) five-year mean growth 
rate in earnings or third year earnings forecast, ii) at least three analysts providing earnings 
forecasts for years 1 and 2, and iii) a statistics release date which preceded the forecast period 
end date. Furthermore, the following requirements had to be met: i) the I/B/E/S price history 
file had to contain a price for the corresponding statistics record period, ii) a positive book value 
per share had to be available in Compustat for the beginning of the fiscal year for which cost of 
equity is estimated, and iii) firms had to be covered in the Fama and French (1997) forty-eight 
industry classifications.  The mean of forecasted five-year earnings growth rate, where 
available, and otherwise, the growth in mean forecasted earnings over the first three years 
constituted our proxy for the firm’s long-term earnings growth.  In the merged database, we 
included annual inflation measured by changes in the consumer price index recorded in the 
 
3 In arriving at 537 restatements, we imposed the following data filters to 918 restatements reported by 
GAO. First, we deleted 130 restatements that were the result of an adoption of new accounting rules. 
Second, we deleted 186 restatements that did not have necessary data for our analysis in the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat databases.  Third, we deleted 25 restatements because 
we could not find necessary information about the restatement in Lexis-Nexis. Fourth, we deleted 20 
restatements because, despite the announcement of a restatement, the firm did not restate financial 
statements. Fifth, we deleted 25 restatements for other reasons.   We found five restatements that were 
not listed in GAO sample. Sixteen restatement announcements in the GAO sample are releases of new 
information regarding already announced restatements. This category also includes restatements that 
were not a result of a mistake or a misinterpretation of accounting rules (for example, restatements due to 
changes in the number of shares). 
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month of June, annual constant maturity ten-year U.S. Treasury bond rate, and three-month 
U.S. Treasury bills rate.4  
We estimated cost of equity capital as described in section 2.1 below. We selected only 
those events for which we were able to estimate at least one valid cost of equity in the three 
month window preceding restatement announcement and one valid cost of equity during a 
three month window after restatement. Our final sample consists of 91 restatements made by 88 
firms (see exhibit 1).  
2.1 Estimation of the Cost of Equity 
Unlike realized returns, a more direct measure of expected returns based on current 
prices, expected earnings per share, dividends, and book value per share, has gained some 
popularity since late 1990s, (e.g., Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Gode and 
Mohanram, 2003; Dhaliwal et al., 2005, 2006; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 2009; 
among others).5  Many recent studies use more than one model to estimate the cost of equity 
capital (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2005, 2006; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005), while others, and especially 
initial studies, relied on cost of equity estimates of a single model (e.g., Claus and Thomas, 2001; 
Gebhardt et al., 2001; Francis et al., 2005).  
We use four popular implied cost of capital models that built on the premises of 
accounting-based residual income valuation methods of Edwards and Bell (1961), Feltham and 
Ohlson (1995), and Ohlson (1995), and abnormal growth models of Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005). These models are Easton (2004 ES), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005 OJ), 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001 GLS), and Claus and Thomas (2001 CT).  We follow 
Dhaliwal et al. (2006) and Hail and Leuz (2006), and use the average of the four different 
estimates of cost of capital to represent the implied cost of capital. We denote the cost of equity 
estimates from these models as KES, KOJ, KGLS and KCT, respectively.  Our final cost of equity 
estimate “K” is the average of the cost of equity estimates of these four models.  From these cost 
 
4 Treasury yields were extracted from the Federal Reserve St. Louis at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. 
5 While our purpose is not to debate the choice of an asset pricing model, it is worth pointing out that 
average realized returns are poor proxies for expected returns (Elton, 1999; Fama and French, 1997, 2004).  
Elton’s (1999) presidential speech focused on the need for an alternative proxy for expected returns.  
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of equity estimates, we calculate the firm’s cost of equity premium by subtracting the yields on 
three-month U.S. Treasury Bills (RP3) and ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds (RP10). The use of RP10 
is more common in the literature (Dhaliwal et al., 2006; Gode and Mohanram, 2003). A more 
detailed description of these methods and their implementation is provided in Appendix A.1, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2006) and Hail and Leuz (2006). 
2.2. Litigation  
Post-restatement firms may be sued either by shareholders through a class action 
lawsuit or by other market participants, such as pension funds and other institutional investors. 
We searched Lexis-Nexis and Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse for 
announcements of litigation after restatements. We retained the announcements that explicitly 
mentioned the restatement as a reason for the lawsuit.  We find that 38.46% of our final sample 
was sued as a result of financial restatements. This is similar to other related studies: 38% in 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) and 34% Bardos et al. (2013).  
Securities litigation is a costly event for the firm, with most of the cost resulting from a 
market rather than regulatory penalty (Gande and Lewis, 2007; Francis et al., 1994). For 
example, Griffin et al., (2004) find that firms named in federal securities class action lawsuits 
experience three-day excess returns of -16.6% at the end of class action period (which is usually 
the date of restatement announcement for restating firms), and -4.1% at the filing of the lawsuit.   
Prior literature finds that firms that restate financial statements face a very high 
probability of litigation. For example, after controlling for stock market characteristics that 
influence litigation risk, Jones and Weingram (1997) find that restatement increases litigation 
risk more than insider trading, seasoned equity offerings, SEC enforcement actions, and 
negative press releases. Similarly, Griffin et al., (2004) find that stock price responses to news of 
securities litigation are more negative for class actions with accounting allegations versus non-
accounting allegations and Chalmers, Naiker and Navissi (2011) find that sued firms have poor 
earnings quality prior to litigation announcement.  Johnson et al., (2007) find that restatements 
were insignificantly associated with the filing of a law suit prior to the enactment of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), but are positively associated with the filing of 
law suits post-PSLRA.6 While a restatement increases litigation risk more than other important 
 
6 See also Geiger, Raghunandan and Rama (2006) and Lam and Mensah (2006). 
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corporate events, not all restating firms are sued (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Bardos et al., 2013; 
and this study). However, prior research suggests that high litigation risk firms are identifiable 
(Jones and Weingram, 1997; Francis et al., 1994). Therefore, at the announcement of restatement, 
investors can assess the likelihood of litigation of restating firms. We hypothesize that firms that 
were sued as a result of restatement will experience larger increases in the cost of equity than 
firms that did not get sued.    
We also examine whether the market anticipates lawsuits and increases the risk 
premium for litigation-triggering restatements prior to restatement announcement. This is 
motivated by the findings in the prior literature that litigation is predictable. For example, 
Gande and Lewis (2007) show that investors partially anticipate shareholder class action 
lawsuits and capitalize part of these losses prior to the lawsuit filing date. They also find that 
high litigation risk firms have greater partial anticipation effects and smaller filing date effects. 
Griffin et al., (2004) find that the outcome of litigation is partially anticipated by the stock 
market and that abnormal returns at the end of the class action period are correlated with the 
outcome of the litigation. Jones and Weingram (1997) and Francis, et al., (1994) find that high 
litigation risk firms are identifiable ex-ante.  
2.3. Control Variables 
Our choice and specification of control variables shown to affect the cost of equity 
capital closely follow Dhaliwal et al. (2005, 2006). First, we use the loadings for the Fama-French 
(1993) three risk factors, namely, MKT, SMB and HML. We estimate these factors by regressing 24 
to 60 months of monthly excess stock returns (over the risk-free rate) in the Fama-French three-
factor model in a window of the prior sixty months ending in the December of the cost of equity 
estimation year. These loadings serve to control for three important firm-specific risk factors 
used in the implied cost of capital literature. i) MKT controls for the effect of systematic risk 
often measured by the firm’s beta and expected to load with a positive coefficient (Dhaliwal et 
al., 2006; Gode and Mohanram, 2003). ii) SMB controls for the effect of size. While negatively 
related to the cost of equity capital (Gebhardt et al., 2001; Francis et al., 2005), SMB being the 
loading against the return in the portfolio of small firms minus large firms is expected to load 
positively with the cost of capital (Dhaliwas et al., 2005; 2006).  iii) HML is a proxy for the book-
to-market ratio and consistent with the predictions in literature expected to load with a positive 
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coefficient. Second, we control for leverage, estimated as the long-term debt divided by (total 
assets less book value of stockholders equity plus the market value of equity), which expect to 
load with a positive sign (consistent with the predictions in Modigliani and Miller, 1958; 
Hamada, 1969; and findings in  Fama and French, 1992; Gode and Mohanram,2003; Boston and 
Plumlee,2005;  Dhaliwal et al., 2006). Third, consistent with the literature, we also include two 
widely used controls for analyst earnings forecast attributes. Coefvar is the standard deviation of 
one-year analyst earnings forecasts scaled by one-year mean earnings forecasts, which is 
expected to load with positive sign consistent with  the literature (Gode and Mohanram, 2003; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2006). Growth is the five-year mean earnings growth forecast from I/B/E/S 
recorded in June of each year and expected to load with positive sign ((Gode and Mohanram, 
2003; Lee et al., 2007).  We also control for industry effects by correcting our standard errors for 
industry and industry effects for robustness.  
2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables and their pair-wise 
correlations. Panel A presents statistical properties of individual explanatory variables. The 
extreme observations in explanatory variables were handled individually instead of 
winsorizing (due to the small sample size), e.g., leverage is truncated at 99% of total capital. 
Panel B of Table 1 provides Pearson correlation coefficients between regression variables. 
Because of the small sample size, some explanatory variables show slightly large correlations. 
However, these correlations are not large enough to cause problems with multicollinearity.  
 
3.  Empirical Results 
3.1 Litigation and Cost of Equity 
First, we test our predictions regarding the effect of litigation-triggering restatements on 
the cost of equity using simple univariate tests. We observe that in 67% of all restatements, firms 
experience an increase in the cost of equity. However, in 83% percent of restatements resulting 
in litigation, firms experience increase in the cost of equity. Fifty-seven percent of firms that do 
not face litigation after restatements experience increase in the cost of equity. As expected, this 
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observation implies that restatements resulting in litigation are more likely to have an adverse 
impact on the firm’s post-restatement cost of equity capital.7 
Furthermore, on average, we observe that the magnitude of the increase in the cost of 
capital is greater for sued firms than for non-sued firms. We formally present and test the 
differences in the cost of equity between the firms with post-restatement litigation and no 
litigation in Table 2. In panels A, B, and C respectively, We estimate the average and standard 
deviation of cost of equity (K), cost of equity in excess of the three-month U.S. Treasury Bill 
yield (RP3), and the cost of equity in excess of the ten-year U.S. Treasury Bond yield (RP10).  
The latter two proxies (i.e., RP3 and RP10) are expected to account for the time variation in 
nominal cost of equity (Hail and Leuz, 2006). First, we compare the average of the cost of equity 
estimates during the three months before the restatement event - the first two rows in each of 
the three panels of Table 2 represent these comparisons. In this table, defendant firms have a 
slightly higher cost of equity than non-sued firms even before the restatement. However, the 
magnitude of this difference is small (about sixty basis points). Second, we compare the average 
of the cost of equity estimates during the three months after the restatement event – the second 
set of two rows in each of the three panels represents these comparisons. As expected, 
defendant firms have substantially higher costs of equity compared to non-sued firms after the 
restatement. The magnitude of this difference is high (over 350 basis points) and consistent with 
the view in the literature that restatement-related litigation costs are generally higher than the 
costs of any other litigation-triggering events (e.g., Jones and Weingram, 1997).   
Finally, we compare the change in the average of the cost of equity estimates post-
restatement relative to pre-restatement. The third set of two rows in each of the three panels 
represents these comparisons. The results show that both types of restating firms experience an 
 
7 Since our implied cost of equity models have forecasted earnings and earnings growth as numerator, 
our models allow us to control for any change in forecasted future cash flows while estimating cost of 
equity capital. Thus, an increase in cost of equity capital is net of any effect in firm valuation through cash 
flows, and it allows us to unravel true effect in cost of equity capital more precisely. In a cursory analysis, 
we do check the effect of litigation in one year ahead earnings per share (EPS1) and long term growth rate 
forecast (Growth). We find that the post re-statement both EPS1 and Growth decline for all firms on 
average, however, average decline (particularly in Growth) is significantly higher for the firms facing 
litigation. This analysis suggests that for the firms facing litigation both the negative effect in cash flows 
and positive effect in discount rate is higher than those of the firms not facing post restatement litigation.  
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increase in the cost of equity after restatement. The increase is about forty basis points for non-
sued firms and significant at the 10% level assuming a one-tailed test. However, the increase in 
the cost of equity is over 350 basis points for firms that are sued after restatement and 
significant at better than 1% level. Collectively, these univariate tests provide some initial 
evidence in support of our hypothesis that litigation is the primary cause of the increase in the 
cost of equity after restatement. Below, we more formally test whether these relationships 
persist after accounting for major determinants of a firm’s cost of equity capital. 
Table 2, Panels D and E also reports changes in analyst expectations of one year ahead 
earnings per share (EPS1) and long-term earnings growth (Growth), respectively. EPS1 and 
Growth before restatement are estimated during three month period (-3 months and -1 months) 
relative to restatement. Similarly, EPS1 and Growth after restatement are also estimated during a 
three month period (+1 months and +3 months) relative to restatement. We find that analysts 
revise their forecast of EPS1 and Growth downwards for both sued and non-sued sub-samples. 
However, the post re-statement downwards revision is statistically significant only for sued 
sub-sample.8 Overall our results indicate that litigation risk is priced both through cash flow 
and cost of capital channels. 
A potential concern with the interpretation of our results is that restatements that 
prompt a larger share price decline are likely to influence both the equity cost of capital and the 
likelihood of litigation. To address this endogeneity concern, we perform an analysis of the cost 
of capital for a sub-sample of sued and non-sued restating firms matched on restatement 
announcement return (CAR01).9 CAR01 is the market model cumulative abnormal return for the 
days zero and plus one relative to restatement. We estimated these cumulative abnormal 
returns based on the market model parameters estimated over a 250 days ending on day -46 
relative to restatement. The daily return on CRSP value-weighted index are the proxies for the 
market returns. The mean of CAR01 equals -18% for sued restating firms, while it is -4% for 
non-sued restating firms. Table 3 shows that the match was successful because the difference in 
 
8 Results are similar when we analyze percent change in all variables. For example, for Growth, percent 
change is calculated as Growth at time t+1 less Growth at time t divided by Growth at time t.  
9 Only the pairs with CAR01 within 1% are considered a successful match, which results in 24 pairs 
comprised of a unique firm facing post restatement litigation and a matching firm not facing post re-
statement litigation.  
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CAR01 between sued and non-sued restatements is not significant for this sub-sample and the 
average CAR01 equals -10%.  We find that the full sample results hold for this sub-sample: cost 
of equity capital increases for both sued and non-sued firms, yet the increase in the cost of 
equity capital is considerably higher for sued firms.  
Empirical model: 
K or K =  +   Litigation + + Controls +    (1) 
We specify the regression variables as follows: 
K = Implied cost of equity capital based on methodology discussed in 
section 2.1;  
K = Post-restatement K less pre-restatement K;  
Litigation =  An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has been sued as a 
result of a restatement as discussed in section 2.2; 
Controls =  A set of firm- and country-level control variables discussed in section 
2.3;  
  = An error term.  
Table 4 provides the main results of this study. As usual, in cross-sectional regressions, 
unspecified heteroskesdasticity is likely to affect our results. Therefore, we initially estimate 
robust standard errors using the White estimator. In each model, we use three different 
dependent variables representing the firm’s cost of equity (K), the cost of equity in excess of the 
yield on three-month U.S. Treasury Bills (RP3), and the cost of equity in excess of the yield on 
ten-year U.S. Treasury Bonds (RP10). The explanatory variables include an indicator for 
litigation and six major determinants of the cost of equity capital. Our base model includes 
three specifications in the first three columns, each including the cost of equity before the event, 
after the event and after less before the event.  The coefficient of Litigation is positive but not 
significant before the event, but is positive and significant at the 1% level after the event.  This 
result suggests that, while investors might capitalize losses prior to litigation as found in Gande 
and Lewis (2006), they increase the cost of equity only after the restatement announcement. 
Moreover, consistent with our predictions, we find that the coefficient on Litigation is positive 
and significant at the 1% level when we account for the increase in the cost of equity after the 
event (after less before).  In the latter six models, we repeat our analysis using RP3 and RP10, 
respectively, and report similar and robust results.   
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In Table 4, we also find that control variables generally load with the predicted signs in 
both the before and after regressions with a few exceptions. For the after less before regressions, we 
do not make a prediction for control variables, but we nevertheless control for them. First, we 
report results for the Fama-French risk factors.  MKT is the proxy for firm market risk, which is 
not significant and thus consistent with Gebhardt et al. (2001).  SMB, our proxy for size which 
measures the degree of information availability about a firm, is positive and significant, 
consistent with Fama and French (1992) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005, 2006).  HML is our proxy for 
the book-to-market ratio. The coefficient on HML is positive (as expected) and significant in the 
before and after regressions, implying that higher book-to-market value firms have higher 
expected returns. Both the literature that uses HML as the proxy for firm book-to-market related 
risk (Dhaliwal et al., 2005, 2006) or a direct measure of the book-to-market value ratio (e.g., 
Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Hail and Leuz, 2006) report positive 
cost of capital effects of higher book-to-market ratios. Second, the estimate of the coefficient on 
leverage is generally positive but its significance varies across models, except for a few cases 
where it is negative but insignificant at higher than the 10% level. We predicted a positive sign 
for this variable based on analytical (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Hamada, 1969) and empirical 
(Fama and French, 1992; Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Boston and Plumlee, 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 
2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 2007; among others) literature. Third, both proxies for analyst 
earnings forecast attributes also have positive signs (as predicted), consistent with the literature. 
Overall, our findings suggest that our cost of equity estimates generally exhibit the expected 
relationships with common risk factors even though our sample size is small.  Moreover, the 
insignificant coefficient of Litigation before financial restatements in the first, fourth, and 
seventh columns of Table 4, and positive and highly significant coefficients in after restatement 
and after less before restatement regressions provides strong evidence that the market prices a 
litigation associated with financial restatements. These results substantially corroborate our 
predictions and univariate results presented at the beginning of this section. Based on the 
coefficient of Litigation in the After less Before regressions, we estimate the economic effect of 
post-restatement litigation as an increase of about 259 basis points in the cost of equity capital. 
3.2. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we perform several sensitivity tests of the results presented in Table 4 to 
examine whether our core evidence that litigation-triggering financial restatements increase the 
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cost of equity is robust. Some robustness tests are reported in Tables 5 through 9 and others are 
unreported. Overall, these tests confirm our baseline analysis that the post-restatement increase 
in the cost of equity is substantially higher for litigation-triggering restatements than 
restatements that do not result in litigation.  
First, the effects of litigation-triggering restatements are likely to be different across 
industries. For example, the prior literature has shown that regulated, financial, technology, and 
retail firms face a higher probability of litigation (Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005; Gande and 
Lewis, 2007). Therefore, one concern is that an excessive concentration of firms from certain 
industries may have affected our results. We mitigate this concern by correcting the standard 
errors by clustering at the industry level. Results reported in Table 5 continue to support our 
hypothesis. In Table 6, we repeat the analysis by correcting standard errors for both unspecified 
heteroskesdasticity and clustering by industry. Our results are robust to this correction. 
Furthermore, in unreported results, we continue to find robust results when controlling for the 
industry using dummy variables (at one-digit sic following John et al., 2008) and using the 
industry average cost of capital.  
Second, in our main regressions in Table 7, we use the specifications employed in 
Dhaliwal et al. (2006) by choosing the Fama-French three factors to represent three major risk 
factors used in the literature. In Table 8, we repeat our tests by using more traditional proxies 
for these risk factors: i) beta from the single factor CAPM instead of MKT to represent market 
risk, ii) the number of sell-side analysts covering the firm as a measure of firm size and 
information availability instead of SMB, and iii) market-to-book ratio as a proxy for market 
anomalies instead of HML. Our core results are robust to the use of these proxies. Moreover, the 
use of these variables also mitigates a concern that high correlation between the Fama-French 
factors and two other firm characteristics as presented in Panel B of Table 9 might have affected 
our core results.10  
 
10 Apart from these corrections, in untabulated robustness tests we also control for a) firm’s natural log of 
total assets in place of SMB. Apart from this, the literature suggests firms’ agency problems and corporate 
governance and firm age may affect cost of equity. Therefore, we control for firm age measured as 
restatement year less the first year the firm appeared in the Centre for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) database and we use CEO_Ownership (as in Kim and Lu, 2011, missing values replaced with 
zero) as the proxy of firm’s agency problems as higher ownership of CEO may imply lower agency 
problems. In controlling for these variables separately our results continue to hold.  
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Third, in our main tests, we compare the cost of equity for three months before and three 
months after the event month. One may argue that our results may be the outcome of our 
choice of the event window and that the increase in the cost of equity as seen in our tests is 
simply a reflection of the short-term market reaction to these events. We mitigate this concern 
by comparing the cost of equity for the four to six (+4 to +6) months after the restatement month 
with the cost of equity for the four to six (-4 to -6) months before the restatement month. Our 
results (unreported) are robust to this change in the event window.  
Fourth, following prior research, we compute the implied cost of equity under two 
major assumptions. First, cost of equity estimates are derived by truncating the expected 
dividend payout ratio by 50% to 100% assuming that, in the long-run, firms are expected to 
distribute earnings back to shareholders (see Claus and Thomas, 2001). We relax this 
assumption and re-estimate the cost of capital by fixing the lower bound of the expected 
dividend payout ratio at 25% and by replacing the expected dividend payout of firms falling 
below this threshold with the industry (Fama-French forty-eight classification) average 
dividend payout ratio. Second, we use the industry median expected return on equity (ROE) —
estimated as forecasted earnings per share for year 1 (FEPS1) divided by book value per share at 
the beginning of the year (BV0)— to estimate FEPS4 to FEPS12, used in our initial estimates of the 
cost of equity under the GLS model. We reproduce our cost of equity estimates based on the 
GLS model and instead use the industry median of realized ROE - estimated as realized fiscal 
year end earnings per share (EPS0) divided by BV0. In unreported results, using these different 
cost of equity estimates does not affect our conclusions. 
Fifth, we replicate our core results reported in Table 4 using specifications in Hribar and 
Jenkins (2004).  The control variables are core, which takes the value of one if the restatement 
relates to core earnings and zero otherwise, company, which takes the value of one if the 
restatement is initiated by the company and zero otherwise, auditor, which takes the value of 
one  if the restatement is initiated by the auditor and zero otherwise,  sec, which takes the value 
of  one  if the restatement is initiated by the SEC and zero otherwise,  size, defined as the 
logarithm of total sales, and leverage  and growth, which are calculated as defined earlier.11 The 
 
11 Forty-three of the sample of ninety-one restatements are restatements of core accounts, thirty-five are 
initiated by an auditor, forty are initiated by the SEC, and seven are initiated by the company. 
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results reported in Table 8 continue to support our hypothesis that the post-restatement change 
in the cost of equity is positively associated with the litigation-triggering restatement.  
We further replicate Table 8 after controlling for other characteristics of restatements, 
such as the magnitude of the mistake (measured as restated net income less originally reported 
net income divided by the absolute value of originally reported net income), number of periods 
restated, and an indicator variable to differentiate restatements that involved only quarterly and 
not annual reports. Our results are robust to adding these additional controls, and the 
coefficients on all of these extra controls, except for number of periods restated, are not statistically 
significant. The coefficient on number of periods restated is positive and significant at 10% level, 
which suggests that the credibility loss is substantially higher for firms that restate multiple 
financial statements. 
Finally, following Hail and Leuz (2006) and Dhaliwal et al. (2006), we rely on the 
average of the cost of equity estimates of four widely used models to estimate our main proxy 
for the cost of equity (K) to reduce the concern of spurious results arising from the use of a 
single model. In Table 9, we replace K with the cost of equity estimated using each of these four 
models (KOJ, KES, KCT and KGLS). All models except for KCT show that, before the restatement, the 
cost of equity of firms with litigation-triggering restatements is not significantly different from 
zero. However, KCT shows that these firms’ cost of equity is about 1.4% higher than the cost of 
equity of the non-litigation subsample even before restatement. However, supporting our main 
hypothesis, all four models give robust results in the after and after less before regressions that the 
cost of equity of the firms facing post-restatement litigation increases significantly. Overall, 
these results provide strong assurance that our inferences are not driven by the distinctive 
characteristics of any single model. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
We empirically examine whether the cost of equity - implied by analyst earnings 
forecasts and current prices - increases for firms that face litigation subsequent to a financial 
restatement, and whether market anticipates litigation before restatement announcement as 
evident from its effect on financing costs. We estimate the cost of equity three months prior to a 
restatement and after a restatement using four models of implied cost of equity: Easton (2004), 
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Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), Gebhardt et al., (2001) and Claus and Thomas (2001). We 
find that the cost of equity increases after restatement for all firms. However, the increase in cost 
of equity is substantially greater for firms facing litigation as a result of the restatement. The 
economic effect of post-restatement litigation is an increase in the firm’s cost of equity of about 
259 basis points. In cross-sectional tests, we also find that litigation is an important determinant 
of the cost of equity after restatement when controlling for other determinants of the cost of 
equity. However, we also find that investors do not significantly adjust the risk premium for 
firms facing litigation prior to a restatement announcement, suggesting that market does not 
anticipate litigation before restatement announcement. Overall, our findings suggest that the 
cost of equity is an important channel through which litigation-triggering restatements affect 
firms.  
Our findings extend prior research on the impact of financial restatements on the cost of 
equity in several ways. This is the first paper to investigate the effect of litigation-triggering 
restatements on the cost of equity. We extend Hribar and Jenkins (2004) by showing that the 
increase in the cost of capital is much more pronounced for firms facing litigation as a result of 
the restatement. While Hribar and Jenkins primarily rely on cost of equity estimates from three 
individual models, we use the average cost of equity estimates from four different models, a 
method which is popular in more recent literature (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2006). Our methodology 
is more robust than that previously used to study the impact of restatements on the cost of 
equity. We also contribute to the literature on litigation. We complement the findings of Gande 
and Lewis (2006), who show that investors capitalize losses related to litigation prior to the 
announcement of litigation. We find robust evidence for the notion that, while investors may 
account for litigation before the litigation event, they do not adjust the risk premium prior to the 
announcement of a restatement by firms that are sued as a result of a restatement. While our 
results are strong, much remains to be done in this line of research. For example, by extending 
the sample substantially one may be able to study several alternative explanations, in particular, 
how the effect of litigation varies with the type of litigation.  
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Appendix A.1 
Cost of Equity Models12 
KMM = Cost of equity estimate of the model as identified in the subscript, for example,  ‘MM’=’CT’ for 
Claus and Thomas (2001) model; FEPST+t=I/B/E/S consensus earnings forecast for the tth year, where 
earnings statistics released at fiscal year end-month plus 6 months; PT=I/B/E/S market price coinciding 
with the release date of FEPS for the estimation year; BT=Book value per share for the estimation year, 
iTiTiTiT DFEPSBB ++−++ −+= 1 ; 
DT+i=FEPST+i*Dividend Payout. Dividend payout is recorded at the 
fiscal year end and is replaced in loss-making firms by the mean of the industry dividend payout 
according to the Fama-French 48 industry classifications estimated using the sample of non-loss making 
firms. Dividend payout for use with the Claus and Thomas (2001) model is fixed at 50% for all firms, 
consistent with Claus and Thomas (2001). 
 



























+−+ ,  y = a constant which is equal to 1+ long-term 
growth rate, the long-term growth rate (y-1) was fixed at the annualized 10-year U.S. Treasury Bond yield 
minus 3%, consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2006). We keep observations that return a cost of equity 
estimate with 0% to 100% to be consistent with other models as described below. 
 































+= +++++     (2) 
The forecasts beyond two years are taken as reported where available, otherwise they were generated 
based on the five-year consensus growth rate forecast or the average growth in FEPS1 to FEPS3.  The long-
term growth rate beyond five years gn= annualized US Treasury bond yield minus 3%.  Finally, we 
manually search for KCT that satisfies equation 2 by searching KCT within 0 to 100%. We exclude 
observations that do not converge. 
 































+= +++−+++     (3) 
FEPST+4 to FEPST+12 is forecasted such that ROE gradually and linearly converges to industry ROE in the 
12th year. Industry ROE is estimated as the five-year moving average of annual median of fiscal year end 
ROE of all firms in an industry based on Fama-French 48 Industry classifications (4 years for 1990). 
Growth in earnings after the 12th year is assumed to be zero. We manually search for KGLS within 0 to 
100%. 
 










=         (4) 
We manually search of KES within 0 to 100%. 
 
12 This section is largely adapted from other papers, such as Guedhami and Mishra (2007).  
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APPENDIX A.2 




Implied cost of equity estimated as the arithmetic average of (Koj, 
Kct, Kgls, Kes as described in Appendix A.1) 
Estimated 
RP3 K less annualized Yield on three-month US Treasury Bills 
Estimated /Federal 
Reserve 





Loading of excess equity return in the market factor of the Fama-




Loading of excess equity return in the small minus large (SMB) 
factor of the Fama-French (1993) three factor model. A proxy for a 




Loading of excess equity return in the high market to book minus 
low market to book (HML) factor of the Fama-French (1993) three 




Total Debt (Long-term Debt - item A9 plus Debt in Current 
Liabilities - item A34) divided by Total Invested Capital – item A37 
calculated for the last fiscal year before restatement. 
Compustat/Research 
Insight 
Coefvar  Standard deviation of estimated first year earnings per share 
divided by mean earnings per share forecast for the first year 
calculated for the month of restatement unless otherwise 
indicated. 
I/B/E/S 
Growth I/B/E/S five-year earnings growth rate where available, 
otherwise estimated as growth in forecasted earnings from Year 1 
to Year 3 calculated for the month of restatement unless otherwise 
indicated. 
I/B/E/S 
EPS1 I/B/E/S forecast of one-year ahead earnings. I/B/E/S 
Litigation An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has been sued as a 
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Exhibit 1 
Final Sample Attribution 
Description Restatements Firms 
Manually collected financial restatement events 537 496 
Matched with IBES & Compustat in event year 345 326 
Have valid observations for the three months before and after 
the event month 332 313 
Met all data requirements for cost of equity estimation 170 163 
Valid cost of equity estimated at least once in the event window 168 161 
Valid cost of equity estimated either before or after restatement 163 156 
Valid cost of equity estimated both before and after restatement 
event 91 88 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean STDEV Min Q1 Median Q3 Max N 
EPS1_Before 1.601 1.645 0.010 0.770 1.340 1.973 14.020 91 
EPS1_After 1.526 1.707 0.040 0.670 1.197 1.620 14.190 91 
EPS1_(After less Before) -0.075 0.459 -2.593 -0.230 0.000 0.130 1.362 91 
Growth_Before 21.025 11.848 3.000 12.083 19.090 26.095 64.000 91 
Growth_After 20.336 11.647 3.000 12.000 19.030 24.000 64.000 91 
Growth_(After less Before) -0.689 2.337 -12.115 -1.397 -0.173 0.390 6.250 91 
K_Before 0.109 0.031 0.028 0.086 0.105 0.126 0.208 91 
K_After 0.125 0.057 0.029 0.095 0.111 0.140 0.443 91 
K_(After less Before) 0.016 0.042 -0.070 -0.004 0.006 0.029 0.287 91 
rp3_Before 0.060 0.031 -0.018 0.039 0.056 0.078 0.157 91 
rp3_After 0.077 0.057 -0.019 0.049 0.063 0.091 0.396 91 
rp3_(After less Before) 0.017 0.042 -0.045 -0.003 0.008 0.031 0.287 91 
rp3_Before 0.051 0.032 -0.028 0.031 0.048 0.070 0.144 91 
rp10_After 0.068 0.057 -0.024 0.035 0.054 0.085 0.386 91 
rp10_(After less Before) 0.017 0.042 -0.059 -0.004 0.007 0.029 0.287 91 
MKT 1.225 0.778 -1.249 0.823 1.150 1.772 3.054 91 
SMB 0.663 0.884 -0.950 -0.010 0.521 1.111 3.908 91 
HML 0.260 1.167 -3.113 -0.089 0.438 0.941 3.343 91 
Leverage 0.426 0.330 0.000 0.077 0.395 0.695 0.990 91 
Coefvar 0.111 0.224 0.000 0.018 0.034 0.088 1.000 91 
 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients  
Variable MKT SMB HML Leverage Coefvar 
SMB 0.26     
HML 0.40 0.19    
Leverage 0.17 -0.11 0.57   
Coefvar -0.03 0.15 0.01 -0.04  
Growth 0.05 0.17 -0.51 -0.51 -0.06 
This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 91 restatements made between 1997 and July 2002. The 
sample of restatements was manually collected from Lexis-Nexis and cross-checked with a sample released by GAO 
2002. For details of sample attribution, please see Exhibit 1. Appendix A.2 reports detailed definitions and data 
sources for our dependent variables K, RP3, and RP10 and all test and control variables. 
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Table 2 
Financial Restatement, Litigation and Implied Cost of Equity and Cash Flow Effect 
Univariate Analysis 
Variable Time Litigation Mean STDEV N T_Stat 
Panel A: K 
K 
Before 
No 0.106 0.028 56  
Yes 0.113 0.036 35  
After 
No 0.110 0.037 56  
Yes 0.148 0.074 35  
After less Before 
No 0.004 0.022 56 1.45* 
Yes 0.035 0.058 35 3.52*** 
Panel B: Growth 
RP3 
Before 
No 0.058 0.029 56   
Yes 0.064 0.036 35  
After 
No 0.062 0.038 56  
Yes 0.101 0.074 35  
After less Before 
No 0.004 0.022 56 1.50* 
Yes 0.037 0.057 35 3.88*** 
Panel C: K       
RP10 
Before 
No 0.049 0.029 56  
Yes 0.056 0.035 35  
After 
No 0.054 0.037 56  
Yes 0.092 0.074 35  
After less Before 
No 0.005 0.021 56 1.67** 
Yes 0.036 0.057 35 3.76*** 
Panel D: EPS1      
EPS1 
Before 
No 1.390 0.948 56  
Yes 1.939 2.348 35  
After 
No 1.369 1.011 56  
Yes 1.778 2.440 35  
After less Before 
No -0.022 0.454 56 -0.36 
Yes -1.161 0.460 35 -2.08** 
Panel E: Growth      
Growth 
Before 
No 18.855 10.800 56  
Yes 24.497 12.757 35  
After 
No 18.594 10.869 56  
Yes 23.124 12.449 35  
After less Before 
No -0.261 2.107 56 -0.93 
Yes -1.372 2.549 35 -3.18*** 
This table shows analyst forecasts of EPS1 and Growth, and estimates of the cost of capital K 
and risk premiums over 3-month US Treasury Bills (RP3) and 10-year US Treasury Bonds 
(RP10) for a sample of 91 restatements made between 1997 and July 2002. For details of 
sample attribution, please see Exhibit 1. Appendix A.2 reports detailed variable definitions. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively for a one-tailed t-test. 
 32  
 
Table 3 
Financial Restatement, Litigation and Implied Cost of Equity 
Univariate Analysis - Sample matched on CAR01 
Variable Time Litigation Mean STDEV N T_Stat 
       
Panel A: CAR01           
CAR01 Days (0;+1) 
Yes -0.099 0.098 24 -4.94*** 
No -0.099 0.101 24 -4.82*** 
Difference in CARs  0.001 0.005 24 0.71 
       
Panel B: K            
K 
Before 
No 0.098 0.028 24  
Yes 0.115 0.027 24  
After 
No 0.106 0.044 24  
Yes 0.143 0.071 24  
After less Before 
No 0.028 0.063 24 1.58* 
Yes 0.008 0.023 24 2.18** 
Panel C: RP3           
RP3 
Before 
No 0.048 0.029 24   
Yes 0.065 0.028 24  
After 
No 0.057 0.045 24  
Yes 0.097 0.071 24  
After less Before 
No 0.009 0.023 24 1.83** 
Yes 0.032 0.062 24 2.51*** 
Panel D: RP10           
RP10 
Before 
No 0.041 0.030 24  
Yes 0.057 0.028 24  
After 
No 0.050 0.044 24  
Yes 0.088 0.071 24  
After less Before 
No 0.010 0.021 24 2.24** 
Yes 0.032 0.062 24 2.51*** 
This table shows estimates of the cost of capital K and risk premiums over 3-month US 
Treasury Bills (RP3) and 10-year US Treasury Bonds (RP10) for a sample of 91 restatements 
made between 1997 and July 2002. The sample of restatements was manually collected from 
Lexis-Nexis and cross-checked with a sample released by GAO 2002. For details of sample 
attribution, please see Exhibit 1. Appendix A.2 reports detailed definitions and data sources 
for K, RP3, and RP10 and Litigation variables. 
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Table 4 
Financial Restatement, Litigation and Implied Cost of Equity 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent 
Variable 














Constant 0.0891*** 0.0687*** -0.0205 0.0434*** 0.0214 -0.0220* 0.0347*** 0.0132 -0.0215* 
 [8.40] [3.66] [-1.66] [4.08] [1.14] [-1.79] [3.19] [0.72] [-1.81] 
Litigation 0.0051 0.0310*** 0.0259*** 0.0042 0.0327*** 0.0285*** 0.0054 0.0324*** 0.0269*** 
 [0.87] [2.83] [2.78] [0.70] [2.95] [3.12] [0.91] [2.96] [2.94] 
MKT 0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0042 0.0001 -0.0036 -0.0036 0.0008 -0.0028 -0.0036 
 [0.19] [-0.49] [-1.08] [0.014] [-0.55] [-0.92] [0.16] [-0.44] [-0.97] 
SMB 0.0134*** 0.0197** 0.0063 0.0132*** 0.0193** 0.0061 0.0118*** 0.0189** 0.0071 
 [3.28] [2.14] [0.84] [3.12] [2.08] [0.84] [2.73] [2.07] [0.98] 
HML 0.0096** 0.0114** 0.0019 0.0104*** 0.0118** 0.0014 0.0107*** 0.0122** 0.0015 
 [2.56] [1.99] [0.47] [2.74] [2.06] [0.36] [2.78] [2.18] [0.39] 
Leverage 0.0020 0.0286 0.0266** -0.0007 0.0291 0.0298** -0.0009 0.0265 0.0274** 
 [0.20] [1.56] [1.99] [-0.074] [1.58] [2.21] [-0.089] [1.45] [2.09] 
Growth 0.0126 0.0783 0.0657 0.0092 0.0760 0.0668 0.0084 0.0759 0.0676 
 [0.29] [0.93] [1.22] [0.21] [0.91] [1.27] [0.18] [0.92] [1.32] 
Coefvar 0.0154 0.0312 0.0158 0.0153 0.0279 0.0126 0.0151 0.0293 0.0142 
 [0.91] [1.12] [0.62] [0.82] [0.92] [0.53] [0.86] [1.01] [0.57] 
Constant 0.0891*** 0.0687*** -0.0205 0.0434*** 0.0214 -0.0220* 0.0347*** 0.0132 -0.0215* 
 [8.40] [3.66] [-1.66] [4.08] [1.14] [-1.79] [3.19] [0.72] [-1.81] 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
AdjR-squared 0.317 0.264 0.116 0.312 0.262 0.141 0.295 0.266 0.137 
This table presents our main results on the relationship between cost of equity, financial restatements, and litigation.  The 
sample of restatements, which were manually collected from Lexis-Nexis, consists of 91 events from 1997 to 2002. Litigation is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the firm has been sued as a result of a restatement. Appendix A.2 reports detailed 
definitions and data sources for our dependent variables K, RP3, and RP10 and all test and control variables. T-statistics based 
on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. Superscript asterisks ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively; one-tailed tests are used only when predictions are made. 
 34  
 
Table 5 
Robustness test set 1: Clustering 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent 
Variable 














Constant 0.0891*** 0.0687*** -0.0205* 0.0434*** 0.0214 -0.0220** 0.0347*** 0.0132 -0.0215** 
 [7.44] [3.74] [-2.04] [4.11] [1.19] [-2.24] [3.16] [0.75] [-2.29] 
Litigation 0.0051 0.0310*** 0.0259*** 0.0042 0.0327*** 0.0285*** 0.0054 0.0324*** 0.0269*** 
 [0.99] [3.34] [2.91] [0.78] [3.30] [3.12] [0.95] [3.35] [2.83] 
MKT 0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0042 0.0001 -0.0036 -0.0036 0.0008 -0.0028 -0.0036 
 [0.19] [-0.47] [-1.00] [0.015] [-0.51] [-0.83] [0.16] [-0.42] [-0.88] 
SMB 0.0134*** 0.0197** 0.0063 0.0132*** 0.0193** 0.0061 0.0118*** 0.0189* 0.0071 
 [3.44] [2.13] [0.81] [3.27] [2.08] [0.83] [2.89] [2.05] [0.95] 
HML 0.0096*** 0.0114** 0.0019 0.0104*** 0.0118** 0.0014 0.0107*** 0.0122** 0.0015 
 [3.26] [2.28] [0.56] [3.19] [2.29] [0.42] [3.41] [2.39] [0.45] 
leverage 0.0020 0.0286* 0.0266** -0.0007 0.0291 0.0298** -0.0009 0.0265 0.0274** 
 [0.27] [1.74] [2.60] [-0.083] [1.64] [2.63] [-0.11] [1.57] [2.60] 
growth 0.0126 0.0783 0.0657 0.0092 0.0760 0.0668 0.0084 0.0759 0.0676 
 [0.23] [0.98] [1.33] [0.18] [0.97] [1.47] [0.16] [0.99] [1.47] 
coefvar 0.0154 0.0312 0.0158 0.0153 0.0279 0.0126 0.0151 0.0293 0.0142 
 [0.84] [1.12] [0.59] [0.78] [0.93] [0.51] [0.80] [1.02] [0.54] 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
AdjR-squared 0.317 0.264 0.116 0.312 0.262 0.141 0.295 0.266 0.137 
This table presents our main results in the relationship between cost of equity, financial restatements, and litigation.  The sample of 
restatements, which were manually collected from Lexis-Nexis, consists of 91 events over from 1997 to 2002. Litigation is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the firm has been sued as a result of a restatement. Appendix A.2 reports detailed definitions and data 
sources for our dependent variables K, RP3, and RP10 and all test and control variables. T-statistics based on robust standard errors 
adjusted by clustering by industry are reported in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. Superscript asterisks ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively; one-tailed tests are used only when predictions are made. 
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Table 6 
Robustness test set 2: Clustering and Heteroskesdasticity 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent 
Variable 














Constant 0.0891*** 0.0687*** -0.0205* 0.0434*** 0.0214 -0.0220** 0.0347*** 0.0132 -0.0215** 
 [7.44] [3.74] [-2.04] [4.11] [1.19] [-2.24] [3.16] [0.75] [-2.29] 
Litigation 0.0051 0.0310*** 0.0259*** 0.0042 0.0327*** 0.0285*** 0.0054 0.0324*** 0.0269*** 
 [0.99] [3.34] [2.91] [0.78] [3.30] [3.12] [0.95] [3.35] [2.83] 
MKT 0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0042 0.0001 -0.0036 -0.0036 0.0008 -0.0028 -0.0036 
 [0.19] [-0.47] [-1.00] [0.015] [-0.51] [-0.83] [0.16] [-0.42] [-0.88] 
SMB 0.0134*** 0.0197** 0.0063 0.0132*** 0.0193** 0.0061 0.0118*** 0.0189* 0.0071 
 [3.44] [2.13] [0.81] [3.27] [2.08] [0.83] [2.89] [2.05] [0.95] 
HML 0.0096*** 0.0114** 0.0019 0.0104*** 0.0118** 0.0014 0.0107*** 0.0122** 0.0015 
 [3.26] [2.28] [0.56] [3.19] [2.29] [0.42] [3.41] [2.39] [0.45] 
leverage 0.0020 0.0286* 0.0266** -0.0007 0.0291 0.0298** -0.0009 0.0265 0.0274** 
 [0.27] [1.74] [2.60] [-0.083] [1.64] [2.63] [-0.11] [1.57] [2.60] 
growth 0.0126 0.0783 0.0657 0.0092 0.0760 0.0668 0.0084 0.0759 0.0676 
 [0.23] [0.98] [1.33] [0.18] [0.97] [1.47] [0.16] [0.99] [1.47] 
coefvar 0.0154 0.0312 0.0158 0.0153 0.0279 0.0126 0.0151 0.0293 0.0142 
 [0.84] [1.12] [0.59] [0.78] [0.93] [0.51] [0.80] [1.02] [0.54] 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
AdjR-squared 0.317 0.264 0.116 0.312 0.262 0.141 0.295 0.266 0.137 
This table presents robustness of results presented in Table 3 on the relationship between cost of equity, financial restatements, and 
litigation.  The sample of restatements, which were manually collected from Lexis-Nexis, consists of 91 events from 1997 to 2002 
Litigation is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has been sued as a result of a restatement. Appendix A.2 reports 
detailed definitions and data sources for our dependent variables K, RP3, and RP10 and all test and control variables. T-statistics 
based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by industry are reported in parentheses beneath each 
coefficient estimate. Superscript asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively; one-
tailed tests are used only when predictions are made. 
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Table 7 
Robustness test set 3: Different Proxies for Risk, Size and Valuation 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent Variable 











Constant 0.1130*** 0.1064*** -0.0066 0.0677*** 0.0583** -0.0094 0.0580*** 0.0511** -0.0070 
 [10.1] [5.08] [-0.56] [5.95] [2.79] [-0.85] [5.19] [2.49] [-0.63] 
Litigation 0.0064 0.0340*** 0.0276*** 0.0054 0.0355*** 0.0301*** 0.0061 0.0349*** 0.0288*** 
 [1.07] [2.88] [2.58] [0.86] [2.84] [2.77] [0.95] [2.85] [2.59] 
Beta 0.0057 0.0032 -0.0025 0.0054 0.0030 -0.0024 0.0052 0.0033 -0.0018 
 [1.40] [0.50] [-0.67] [1.35] [0.49] [-0.66] [1.29] [0.54] [-0.50] 
AnalystCoverage -0.0102*** -0.0180*** -0.0079*** -0.0106*** -0.0177*** -0.0070*** -0.0098*** -0.0180*** -0.0082*** 
 [-2.97] [-3.82] [-3.23] [-3.17] [-4.03] [-3.22] [-3.10] [-4.24] [-3.54] 
market_book -0.0031*** -0.0034*** -0.0003 -0.0031*** -0.0033*** -0.0002 -0.0031*** -0.0034*** -0.0003 
 [-4.80] [-3.44] [-0.56] [-4.76] [-3.29] [-0.40] [-4.69] [-3.50] [-0.49] 
leverage 0.0137 0.0374 0.0238** 0.0116 0.0385 0.0269** 0.0127 0.0369 0.0242** 
 [1.00] [1.64] [2.25] [0.75] [1.60] [2.52] [0.81] [1.57] [2.38] 
growth 0.0372 0.1043 0.0671 0.0301 0.0990 0.0688 0.0304 0.0987 0.0684 
 [0.65] [1.01] [1.24] [0.52] [0.97] [1.37] [0.54] [0.99] [1.34] 
coefvar 0.0114 0.0306 0.0192 0.0114 0.0274 0.0161 0.0103 0.0283 0.0180 
 [0.55] [1.22] [0.77] [0.51] [0.98] [0.68] [0.47] [1.08] [0.74] 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
AdjR-squared 0.339 0.280 0.123 0.331 0.270 0.145 0.323 0.278 0.141 
This table presents robustness of results presented in Table 3 on the relationship between cost of equity, financial restatements, and 
litigation.  The sample of restatements, which were manually collected from Lexis-Nexis, consists of 91 events from 1997 to 2002 
Litigation is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has been sued as a result of a restatement. Appendix A.2 reports detailed 
definitions and data sources for our dependent variables K, RP3, and RP10 and all test and control variables. Among the additional 
variables, beta is the beta from the single factor CAPM, AnalystCoverage is the number of analysts following a firm, market_book is 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity. T-statistics based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by industry are reported in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. Superscript asterisks ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively; one-tailed tests are used only when predictions are made. 
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Table 8 
Robustness test set 4: Hribar and Jenkins (2004) Specifications 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent 
Variable 











Constant 0.1347*** 0.1110** -0.0237 0.0834*** 0.0586 -0.0248 0.0699*** 0.0467 -0.0232 
 [4.29] [2.59] [-0.74] [3.29] [1.36] [-0.79] [2.75] [1.09] [-0.74] 
Litigation 0.0082 0.0325** 0.0243*** 0.0062 0.0336*** 0.0274*** 0.0067 0.0330*** 0.0263*** 
 [1.26] [2.63] [2.66] [0.84] [2.70] [3.04] [0.92] [2.67] [2.91] 
core -0.0002 -0.0050 -0.0048 0.0011 -0.0046 -0.0056 0.0013 -0.0052 -0.0065 
 [-0.024] [-0.44] [-0.57] [0.16] [-0.40] [-0.68] [0.20] [-0.46] [-0.78] 
company 0.0068 0.0228 0.0160 0.0044 0.0193 0.0149 0.0076 0.0233 0.0157 
 [0.71] [1.13] [1.07] [0.37] [0.95] [1.01] [0.64] [1.15] [1.06] 
auditor -0.0088 0.0083 0.0171 -0.0116 0.0022 0.0139 -0.0095 0.0048 0.0143 
 [-0.53] [0.29] [0.82] [-0.70] [0.079] [0.67] [-0.57] [0.17] [0.69] 
sec -0.0010 -0.0055 -0.0045 -0.0073 -0.0105 -0.0032 -0.0030 -0.0058 -0.0028 
 [-0.10] [-0.28] [-0.31] [-0.63] [-0.53] [-0.22] [-0.26] [-0.30] [-0.19] 
size -0.0043* -0.0032 0.0011 -0.0031 -0.0023 0.0009 -0.0030 -0.0022 0.0008 
 [-1.86] [-0.77] [0.35] [-1.28] [-0.54] [0.29] [-1.23] [-0.53] [0.27] 
leverage 0.0167 0.0366* 0.0199 0.0127 0.0367* 0.0241 0.0138 0.0356* 0.0217 
 [1.08] [1.79] [1.32] [1.05] [1.79] [1.61] [1.14] [1.74] [1.45] 
growth -0.0340 0.0174 0.0514 -0.0334 0.0237 0.0571 -0.0327 0.0251 0.0579 
 [-0.50] [0.25] [1.00] [-0.81] [0.34] [1.13] [-0.79] [0.36] [1.14] 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Adj R-squared 0.018 0.133 0.131 0.008 0.138 0.151 0.007 0.134 0.142 
This table presents robustness of results presented in Table 3 on the relationship between cost of equity, financial 
restatements, and litigation.  The sample of restatements, which were manually collected from Lexis-Nexis , consists of 91 
events from 1997 to 2002. Litigation is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has been sued as a result of a 
restatement. Appendix A.2 reports detailed definitions and data sources for our dependent variables K, RP3, and RP10. Core 
is one if the restatement relates to core earnings and zero otherwise; company is one if the restatement initiated by company 
and zero otherwise; auditor is one if the restatement initiated by auditor and zero otherwise; sec is one if the restatement 
initiated by SEC and zero otherwise; size is log of total sales, leverage is total debt divided total market value equity plus 
total debt, growth is the long-term growth in earnings forecasts. T-statistics based on robust standard errors and adjusted for 
heteroskesdasticity are reported in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. Superscript asterisks ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively; one-tailed tests are used only when predictions are made. 
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Table 9 
Robustness test set 5: Model Cost of Equity 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 














Constant 0.0963*** 0.0795*** -0.0169 0.0931*** 0.0766*** -0.0166 0.0752*** 0.0413* -0.0338** 0.0839*** 0.0684*** -0.0154** 
 [9.34] [4.49] [-1.25] [6.58] [3.27] [-0.88] [6.44] [1.80] [-2.23] [9.82] [5.61] [-2.52] 
Litigation 0.0031 0.0290*** 0.0259*** -0.0018 0.0305** 0.0323*** 0.0140** 0.0438*** 0.0298** 0.0038 0.0202*** 0.0165*** 
 [0.47] [3.16] [3.03] [-0.21] [2.37] [2.60] [2.03] [2.48] [1.97] [0.70] [2.56] [3.25] 
MKT 0.0002 -0.0046 -0.0048 0.0006 -0.0058 -0.0064 0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0038 -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0008 
 [0.053] [-0.72] [-1.19] [0.10] [-0.66] [-1.05] [0.32] [-0.25] [-0.70] [-0.14] [-0.27] [-0.32] 
SMB 0.0129*** 0.0158** 0.0029 0.0162*** 0.0181* 0.0019 0.0135*** 0.0307* 0.0172 0.0112*** 0.0145*** 0.0033 
 [3.17] [2.14] [0.48] [2.98] [1.89] [0.23] [2.84] [1.91] [1.25] [3.68] [2.67] [0.90] 
HML 0.0087** 0.0115** 0.0029 0.0115** 0.0151* 0.0036 0.0105** 0.0107 0.0001 0.0086*** 0.0092** 0.0006 
 [2.29] [2.07] [0.70] [2.31] [1.94] [0.59] [2.42] [1.47] [0.023] [2.79] [2.33] [0.28] 
leverage 0.0097 0.0325* 0.0228 0.0120 0.0368 0.0248 0.0052 0.0489** 0.0437** -0.0105 0.0042 0.0147** 
 [0.93] [1.84] [1.61] [0.83] [1.48] [1.17] [0.45] [2.10] [2.54] [-1.25] [0.34] [2.01] 
growth 0.0373 0.1023 0.0650 0.0275 0.1056 0.0782 0.0581 0.1302 0.0721 -0.0356 0.0103 0.0459** 
 [0.92] [1.37] [1.27] [0.52] [1.10] [1.22] [1.16] [1.12] [0.87] [-1.15] [0.23] [2.04] 
coefvar 0.0239 0.0497 0.0258 0.0560* 0.1029** 0.0469 -0.0178 -0.0334 -0.0156 -0.0105 -0.0038 0.0066 
 [1.17] [1.66] [0.91] [1.75] [2.28] [1.01] [-1.44] [-1.31] [-0.67] [-0.82] [-0.20] [0.53] 
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Adj R-squared 0.279 0.305 0.122 0.309 0.270 0.076 0.307 0.211 0.080 0.277 0.231 0.166 
This table presents robustness of results presented in Table 3 on the relationship between cost of equity, financial restatements, and litigation.  The sample of restatements, which 
were manually collected from Lexis-Nexis , consists of 91 events from 1997 to 2002 Litigation is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has been sued as a result of a 
restatement. Dependent variables are the cost of equity estimates of each of the models as defined in Appendix A.1. Appendix A.2 reports detailed definitions and data sources 
for all test and control variables. T-statistics based on robust standard errors, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, and clustered by industry are reported in parentheses beneath each 
coefficient estimate. Superscript asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively; one-tailed tests are used only when predictions are 
made. 
 
